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Abstract Suppose that a player can make progress on n jobs, and her goal is to complete a
target job among them, as soon as possible. Unfortunately she does not know what the target
job is, perhaps not even if the target exists. This is a typical situation in searching and testing.
Depending on the player’s prior knowledge and optimization goals, this gives rise to various
optimization problems in the framework of game theory and, sometimes, competitive analysis.
Continuing earlier work on this topic, we study another two versions. In the first game, the player
knows only the job lengths and wants to minimize the completion time. A simple strategy that
we call wheel-of-fortune (WOF) is optimal for this objective. A slight and natural modification,
however makes this game considerably more difficult: If the player can be sure that the target
is present, WOF fails. However, we can still construct in polynomial time an optimal strategy
based on WOF. We also prove that the tight absolute bounds on the expected search time. In the
final part, we study two competitive-ratio minimization problems where either the job lengths or
the target probabilities are known. We show their equivalence, describe the structure of optimal
strategies, and give a heuristic solution.
Keywords Searching . Game theory . Nonclairvoyant scheduling
1. Introduction
1.1. Search-schedule games
We study a type of games against nature which we call search-schedule games. A player is
searching for an object called the target, amongst several candidate objects. In order to verify
or falsify that an object is the target, she has to perform a certain job on that object. The goal
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is to find the target, i.e., to complete the target job soon, but unfortunately, the player does not
know what the target is (otherwise there is nothing to investigate). The general question is which
search strategy one should apply.
Such situations naturally arise in chemical or biological laboratories: We look for a substance,
a gene, etc., which has a certain property. We know, or we have strong evidence, that this target
exists, because its effect has been observed, and several candidates for the target have been
isolated. Concrete applications may be: searching for trait genes with the help of linkage analysis
or knock-out experiments, drug testing, etc.
In the analysis of such a search task we can abstract from many details, like the nature of
objects we consider, and the kind of job one has to perform to check the property in question.
We just model those characteristics which are relevant to the performance of a search strategy.
The player, i.e., the lab, has limited working capacities and can only go on with a certain amount
of work per time. Hence, basically we have the problem of scheduling the candidate jobs so as
to promote early success. This gives rise to interesting theoretical questions, but hopefully the
considerations are also of immediate practical interest, as it is important to use work-time and
other resources in labs economically.
We focus on simple model assumptions which are often reasonable but can, of course, also be
extended in various directions, in order to capture more complicated experimental situations. We
will assume that all candidates are checked independently. This means, no piece of work is shared
by the jobs of several candidates, and what we learn about one candidate does not imply anything
new for other candidates. Moreover, we allow preemption. The player can switch between the
jobs and resume an interrupted job later, without penalties. Therefore, we can (approximately,
on a coarsened time axis) even say that we mix several jobs, that is, we can continuously assign
fractions of time to them. We also use the term round-robin schedule for a mix of jobs. Mixing
is even more natural if the lab can distribute several jobs among equally fast workers, such that
all the jobs are processed in parallel (with linear speed-up).
Clearly, under the above assumptions, the only relevant property of a job is its processing
time. Instead of physical time, we may be interested in the costs of doing the several pieces of
work involved in a job. In either case, we call the total cost of a job (time or other costs) the
length of the job.
We may demand that the target job must be finished in any case, even if all other candidates
have already been identified as false. That is, the target must be explicitly verified, in order to
exclude the possibility that we missed the target in our current set of candidates. However, if the
player is sure that the target is in the candidate set, she need not finish the last job in case that all
other candidates are already falsified.
1.2. Discussion of models and outline of our technical contributions
First let us consider n jobs with known lengths ci . That means, the player knows in advance for
each object how long it will take to check it. We may scale any instance such that ∑ni=1 ci = 1.
An adversary chooses the target, this reflects the player’s ignorance. Suppose that the player
wants to minimize her search time, i.e., the time to finish the target job. Trivially, the worst-case
time is 1. However, the player may randomize. Intuitively it seems clear that the (expected)
search time can be roughly halved by randomization, but exact results are less trivial, mainly
because the jobs have different lengths. Amazingly, the two problem versions mentioned above
behave quite differently: If the player is not sure that the target is in the candidate set, an optimal
randomized strategy is easy to obtain (Section 2). For reasons that become obvious soon, we
call it the wheel-of-fortune (WOF). But if the player is sure about the presence of the target, the
problem becomes much much more tricky. (Note that nothing is paradoxical with this statement.)
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However, we show in Section 3 that an optimal mixed strategy with WOF as a building block
can still be computed in polynomial time and uses only O(n) different permutations of jobs. The
nonstraightforward step is to design the structure of the mixed strategy. Also, an open problem
in Section 3 indicates’ that this is not trivial: We don’t know whether our proposed strategy has
already the minimum number of permutations. We are also able to prove tight absolute bounds
on the expected search times of randomized strategies: 1/2 and 9/16.
As a motivation of the problem above, think of a lab that has to solve many instances of this
type. Then an optimal randomized strategy based on the known job lengths would, in the long run,
give the best guarantee (subject to unlikely deviations) for the total amount of work, whatever
the actual sequence of targets will be. Already some percents of saving could be attractive.
We believe that provably good strategies for search problems can have long-term economical
implications.
A remarkable feature of WOF and its modification (Section 3) is that they would start on longer
jobs with higher probability than on shorter jobs, although the player only wants to identify one
target job in each instance of the game. This might appear counterintuitive, however, the reason
is quite clear: These strategies minimize the expected search time under the worst circumstances,
and in unfortunate cases targets might appear more frequently among longer jobs.
A rationale for this pessimistic assumption is to model other competing labs that might employ
other strategies in the search for the same target. Targets with short decision time are easier to
verify, but if no such discovery for any of our candidates has been published so far, this suggests
that the target might be among the longer jobs. On the other hand, we do not know how many
competitors are working on the same questions, and how they think strategically.
The case of complete ignorance of probabilities provides an upper bound for the performance
of strategies against weaker adversaries. In other scenarios, however, it may be justified to assign
prior probabilities pi to the candidates. Moreover, it can be more sensible to minimize the ratio
of search time and target length, rather than the absolute search time. This suggests several other
models that we define next.
As above, lengths c1, . . . , cn are given, and a malicious adversary selects the target. But now
we aim at minimizing the competitive ratio t/c j , where t is the time needed by the player’s
strategy, and c j is the target length. More precisely, we wish to minimize max j t/c j . In the
case of randomized strategies we replace t with the expected time. We refer to this problem
as competitive ratio for known lengths (CRKL). It is sensible, e.g., if the job lengths differ a
lot. Then the “regret” is high if the actual target job was short. Intuition tells that competitive
strategies prefer short jobs.
We also introduce a “dual” scenario. This time, the target probabilities p1, . . . , pn are given,
i.e., known to the player, but not the lengths ci . In other words, the adversary has no control on
the choice of the target, but she determines the job lengths and does not reveal them. Due to the
unknown ci , the absolute time is meaningless as a performance measure for a strategy, therefore
we consider the competitive ratio.
It is crucial for the model to say when the adversary fixes the job lengths. If she can do
this after the target has been chosen, she will make the nontarget jobs very long compared
to the target (infinite, for simplicity). Clearly, this creates the worst situation for the player. It
is not hard to prove (Damaschke, 2004) that the deterministic round-robin strategy assigning
time fractions xi proportional to
√pi to the jobs gives the optimal expected competitive ratio
∑
pi/xi = (
∑ √pi )2. Randomization won’t help, because the game is Bayesian. Permanent
preemption of jobs is necessary, of course, since otherwise the player could become obsessed
with a long nontarget job. This model reflects a situation where the player can verify the target,
but not explicitly falsify the other candidates. The problem becomes more subtle if the adversary
has to fix the lengths c1, . . . , cn , before the target is determined. This adversary is weaker, as
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the player could be able to exclude non-targets, namely if she can finish those jobs. Hence there
might exist a strategy with expected competitive ratio better than (∑ √pi )2. We leave this as
an open question. At least we can say that such a strategy would have to be randomized: Any
deterministic strategy has to begin in a round-robin fashion with specified fractions xi . Now,
if the adversary takes ci = xi for all i, all jobs are finished at the same time, and the expected
competitive ratio (expectation with respect to the random target choice) becomes ∑ pi/xi . But
we already know that this is at least (∑ √pi )2.
Interestingly, the picture changes completely if we want to minimize the ratio of expected
costs in the second model. We call this problem ratio of expectations for known probabilities
(REKP). As a motivation, think of a lab that has to solve many instances of similar order of
magnitude permanently. In the long run, it makes sense to compare the total amount of working
hours to the total length of targets. This amortized comparison is more “mild” than the expected
ratio of costs for every instance. In view of one instance, we divide our expected search time by
the expected target length (rather than the actual target length).
We will show in Section 4 that REKP and CRKL are equivalent to optimization problems.
In Section 5 we compute the value of the CRKL game, prove some block-structure of certain
optimal strategies, and propose an approximation heuristic. However, the complexity status of
CRKL remains an intriguing open question.
1.3. Related literature
We refer to Myerson (1991) and Borodin and El-Yaniv (1998) for general introductions to game
theory and competitive analysis, respectively.
We got results for competitive ratios of several other search-schedule games earlier (Dam-
aschke, 2004), starting from a concrete motivation from genetics. The scenarios in Damaschke
(2004) are different from CRKL and relationships are already discussed above. Games where
the absolute time shall be minimized, as in Sections 2–3 of the present paper, are not studied in
Damaschke (2004).
Our field is loosely related to “fair” variants of nonclairvoyant scheduling (Motwani et al.,
1994; Bansal et al., 2003; Chrobak et al., 2002; Mastrolilli, 2003) as well as geometric search
problems (Lo´pez-Ortiz and Schuierer, 2002). Online construction of hybrid algorithms for search
tasks is stated as another motivation of this line of research in Lo´pez-Ortiz and Schuierer (2002),
following Kao et al. (1994).
The cow-path problem is to find an object hidden at a point on one of n ≥ 2 rays emanating
from a central point. The search time is proportional to the distance walked. Optimal deterministic
and randomized competitive ratios have been determined for plenty of variants of the problem
(Baeza-Yates et al., 1993; Kao et al., 1996), among others the variant with bounded (but not
fixed) distances, e.g., in Lo´pez-Ortiz and Schuierer (1998). Our first problem can be considered
as the cow-path problem on n rays where the putative position of the object is already known
for each ray. Due to the known distances it also makes sense to minimize the absolute search
time, alternatively to the competitive ratio. Apparently, this natural variant is not addressed in
the “cow-path literature.” A set of possible probability distributions of the unknown location
is assumed in Kao and Littman (1997), and algorithms for minimizing the search time and the
competitive ratio are given for the 2-ray case. Reduction to a matrix game is explicitly utilized
there.
This game of searching a hidden object by walking along paths can be considered on arbitrary
graphs. The work in Gal (2001) contains results for the expected search time in different types of
graphs, depending on Eulerian properties. The complexity of the problem with bounded resources
(i.e., search length) is studied in Stengel and Werchner (1997). These papers which also work
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with the interpretation as matrix games are closest to the present work, but the type of results
is different. Remarkably, none of the above mentioned and other investigated articles quote any
earlier results on exactly the problems we consider here. To our best knowledge our results are
new, although the problems look very natural and fundamental.
A rich theory of searching for lost items (or persons) in the context of search-and-rescue
operations, with many natural definitions of parameters and optimization goals, dates back to,
e.g., Koopman (1946) and Charnes and Cooper (1958), published in 1946 and 1958, and has
been further developed over decades. However, the focus is on complicated models that capture
many aspects of this application domain, different from our simplistic scenarios. A recent review,
discussion, and bibliography can be found in Cooper et al. (2003), earlier surveys are (Benkoski
et al., 1991; Frost, 1999).
1.4. Remarks about the notation
Throughout the paper, the terms increasing and decreasing are meant in the nonstrict sense,
with equality allowed. To avoid double sums and lengthy subscripts, the range of a summation
is sometimes described just by a condition on the summation indices. For instance, if it is clear
from context that k is a fixed integer,
∑
i≤ j≤k means that i, j are the summation indices, and the
sum is taken over all ordered pairs (i, j) that fulfill the condition.
2. The wheel-of-fortune strategy
We study the game with n jobs of known lengths ci , such that ∑ni=1 ci = 1, and a player who
wants to minimize the expected search time in the worst case, i.e., maximized over all adversarial
strategies to select a target.
Since the player does not learn anything new during a game until the target is identified,
she can take all her random decisions already in the beginning, and then proceed with the jobs
according to her choice. Thus any strategy of the player is equivalent to a probability distribution
on the (deterministic) schedules. We say that a schedule appears in a strategy if it has positive
probability there.
The following lemma says that preemption is useless, not only in the game considered here
but also under more general assumptions.
Lemma 2.1. Consider any search-schedule game where all jobs end after finite time and the
performance measure depends monotonically on the job completion times,1 and an optimal
strategy exists.2 Then there is also a nonpreemptive optimal strategy, that is, a random distribution
on the permutations of jobs.
Proof: Consider a strategy and any of the schedules appearing there. If, in this schedule, a mix
of jobs is processed during some time interval [t, u], we denote by v ≤ u the first moment after
t where some of the jobs involved, say job i, is finished. Let v := u if there is no such job, in that
case let i be any of the jobs in this mix. If we do all pieces of job i allocated to [t, v] just before v
instead, and “compact” the other jobs to the remaining interval after t, we will not aggravate the
1 such as, in our case, the search time.
2 We have to demand this explicitly. In general there could be a sequence of strategies whose performances converge
to some number that cannot be achieved exactly.
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completion time of any job. In this way we can “demix” the whole schedule and replace it with
a sequence of intervals where only one job is done at a time, without making the strategy worse.
Now consider a schedule without round-robin parts, as obtained above. It may still have
preemptions. If the player interrupts a job i to switch to job j at some moment v, job i is not
finished yet at v. If we exchange the two intervals, job j cannot end later than before, and the
completion time of job i is not affected. Now it is clear how to get rid of all preemptions. 
Remark 2.2. Due to Lemma 2.1 we end up in a finite matrix game. The player’s pure strategies
are exactly the permutations of jobs, the adversary’s pure strategies are the targets. Using game-
theory terminology, we may speak of mixed strategies. The famous von Neumann theorem
guarantees the existence of optimal mixed strategies for both player and adversary.
Given a mixed strategy for the player, let s( j) denotes the expected search time if j is the
target. The player has to adjust the probabilities of permutations so as to minimize max j s( j).
We introduce the following strategy called Wheel-of-fortune (WOF) which is barely random
and computationally almost trivial: Arrange the jobs in an arbitrary cyclic order on a circle of
circumference 1, assigning to job i a circular arc of length ci . Choose a random point r (uniformly
distributed) on the circle. Execute the job whose segment is hit by r completely, then continue in
the cyclic order until the target job is finished. The naming Wheel-of-fortune has obvious reasons.




i ), regardless of the target j
and the cyclic order. Moreover, WOF is an optimal strategy.
Proof: By linearity of expectation, the expected search time is the expected time 1/2 from r to
completion of the target job, plus the expected time to work on the first job before point r is
reached. Since job i is hit by r with probability ci , and in that case the latter term is ci/2, we get
the result.
Let the adversary follows the mixed strategy to choose i with probability pi = ci as the target.
She may even reveal her pi . Then for any fixed permutation schedule, the expected search time
(where expectation refers to the randomness on the adversary’s side) is the same expression as
before, by essentially the same calculation. Using linearity of expectation again, this remains
true for mixed strategies. Hence the player cannot improve her result. 
Remark 2.4. An obvious upper bound on the expected search time of WOF is 12 (1 + c), where
c denotes the maximum job length.
3. If the target is certainly in the candidate set
If the player knows in advance that the target is among the candidates, then, in order to identify the
target, there is no need to run the target job in case that this is the only remaining job (unless the
player is supposed to explicitly verify the target in any case). This seemingly slight modification
of the game changes its structure fundamentally, as it breaks the nice circular symmetry in the
previous problem. As a consequence, WOF is no longer optimal, already for n = 2: Obviously
it is always the best to run the shorter job. This observation can be immediately generalized: If
c ≥ 1/2, then any strategy that schedules the long job last is optimal, since the expected search
time of the long job is 1 − c ≤ 1/2, and any strategy that schedules the long job earlier would
make things worse, as the adversary may always select the long job as the target. The case
c < 1/2 turns out to be more difficult. It is treated in the remainder of this section.
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First of all, by Lemma 2.1 preemption is also useless in this setting, hence the problem
reduces to a finite game as above (Remark 2.2). An adversary strategy in this game is given by
the probabilities p j that job j is the target job. By fundamental results from game theory we have:
If the player knew that the adversary applies her optimal strategy, she could even apply a pure
strategy, that is, a certain permutation P of jobs, to achieve the optimal expected search time: Due
to an obvious exchange argument, ordering the jobs by ascending c j/p j is optimal for the player.
Now we study the structure of a pair of optimal strategies for both the player and adversary.
Without loss of generality (W.l.o.g.) let the jobs be numbered in the order they have in P.
Then the expected search time can be written as
∑
i≤ j<n ci p j +
∑
i<n ci pn . The first n − 1 jobs
are sorted by increasing ratios ci/pi , otherwise P would not be optimal, by an obvious exchange
argument. Similarly, job n cannot be shorter than job n − 1 in P.
The adversary would choose the pi so as to maximize the expected search time the player can
guarantee herself. Assume c j/p j < c j+1/p j+1 for some j ≤ n − 2. We transfer some amount
of probability from j to j + 1, without changing the order of the c j/p j . It is easy to see that the
above sum increases, hence the adversary’s strategy was not optimal. This contradiction shows
that all c j/p j for j < n must be equal. This implies for all j < n that
p j = 1 − pn1 − cn c j .









since the first sum does no longer depend on the numbering. However, there still remain some
degrees of freedom: We have to clarify which job is number n, and to fix its probability pn . This
would completely determine an optimal adversary strategy.
We have seen above that job n must not be shorter than job n − 1. Since any of the first n − 1
jobs could be at position n − 1, we conclude that job n must be one with maximum length c.
With p := pn , the expected search time E becomes










ci c j .
Since
∑
j<n c j = 1 − c, we easily get
w = 1





















Thus, w is just the expected search time WOF would have for the previous problem, on the
instance consisting of the first n − 1 jobs. (Compare to Theorem 2.3, and note the scaling factor
1 − c.) We write the expected search time concisely as
E = (1 − p)w + p(1 − c). (1)
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It remains to determine p. By the simple upper bound for WOF (Remark 2.4) we have








≤ 1 − c,
thus expression (1) increases with p. However, if the adversary sets p too large, a permutation
where the longest job is the last is no longer the player’s best pure strategy. More specifically:
As long as p ≤ c, fraction c/p is not smaller than all the other (equal) c j/p j , so that the player
would put the longest job at the end. This also shows p ≥ c. Now, either the longest job is
at the last position or not, and in the latter case it will be scheduled first, because c/p is now
the minimum ratio. To express the expected search time in the latter case, define d ≤ c as the
length of the second largest job. Since all c j/p j ( j < n) are equal, the second largest job is now
scheduled last. The expected search time becomes







To prove this claim, note the following: The first job (of length c) must be executed first,
regardless of the target. With probability 1 − p, one of the other jobs is the target. If we
had to finish the target job, we would need to add expected search time w. However, the
last job is never executed. It is the target with conditional probability d1−c (as target proba-
bilities are already proportional to the lengths), and in that case we can deduct d from the
search time. Expression (2) obviously decreases with p. Therefore, the adversary maximizes
the minimum of (1) and (2) by choosing p that makes them equal. Algebraic manipulation
gives
p = c(1 − c) − d
2
(1 − c)2 − d2 (3)
and
1 − p = (1 − c)(1 − 2c)(1 − c)2 − d2 . (4)
Together with (1), this yields the optimal expected search time
E = (1 − c)(1 − 2c)w + c(1 − c)
2 − (1 − c)d2
(1 − c)2 − d2 . (5)
This is not a particularly lovely expression. We renumber the jobs so that c1 ≤
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Theorem 3.1. The optimal expected search time E, i.e., the value of the game, is given by (6).
Consequently, this value can be computed in polynomial time from the job lengths, and 1/2 is a
general lower bound on the expected search time if c < 1/2. 
Next we give a mixed strategy for the player that guarantees this value E against any adversary
and is therefore optimal. The lower bound proof suggests a strategy that is basically WOF except
that the two longest jobs play a special role. It remains to adjust the probabilities. For the moment
we abuse notation and denote the two longest jobs by c and d, and a WOF schedule of the other
n − 2 jobs by “WOF.” Our strategy uses three types of schedules: (d, WOF, c), (c, WOF, d), and
(WOF, d, c). The last option is selected with probability
q = s(1 − c)2 − d2 ,
while any of the first two options is chosen with probability 12 (1 − q). Independently, the n − 2
shortest jobs are scheduled, according to WOF.
Anyway, we have to show that, for each possible target job, only the expected time in (6) is
needed to identify this target. We further simplify (6) by replacing s with q((1 − c)2 − d2). We
get E = 12 (1 + q + 2qc).
Case 1. The longest job (of length c) is the target. Clearly, our expected search time is
1
2
(1 + q)(1 − c) + 1
2
(1 − q)c = 1
2
(1 + q − 2qc).
Case 2. The second longest job (of length d) is the target. Similarly, our expected search time is
1
2
(1 − q)(d + 1 − d) + 1
2
q(2 − 2c) = 1
2
(1 + q − 2qc).
Case 3. One of the other jobs is the target. Let v be the WOF time for the first n − 2 jobs, that
is,



















1 − c − d + q (1 − c)
2 − d2




(1 − c − d + q(1 − c + d)).
The expected search time for each of these jobs is
v + 1
2
(1 − q)(c + d) = 1
2
(1 + q − 2qc).
Hence all jobs have the optimal expected search time E, and we can formulate the main result
for our problem:
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Theorem 3.2. There is an optimal mixed strategy (given above) where not more than 3(n − 2)
different permutations appear, whose probabilities can be computed in polynomial time from the
job lengths.
It remains open whether 3(n − 2) is the best “permutation complexity” of a polynomially
computable optimal strategy. We also mention that the plain WOF strategy approximates the
optimum very well if c is small. This might be good enough in practice, since the job lengths in
real applications can be predicted only approximately.
Recall that Theorem 3.1 gives a uniform lower bound of 1/2. This result is tight since, for any
 > 0, there are instances of many short jobs where the player can obviously reach the expected
search 1/2 +  for all jobs. An analogous question is how long the expected search time of the
optimal strategy can be. Using our findings, it is not hard to give the complete answer.
Theorem 3.3. There exists an instance with expected search time 9/16, and this is the worst
case.
Proof: Consider four jobs of equal length, i.e., 1/4. We have c = d = 1/4, s = 1/8, hence
q = 1/4, and 12 (1 + q − 2qc) = 9/16. For the upper bound, we come back to (6). It suffices
to show that (1−2c)s(1−c)2−d2 >
1
8 is impossible. For any fixed c and d, by convexity of the square
function, s is maximized if all “small” job lengths are d, which implies s ≤ (1 − c − d)d . Thus
the above assumption enforces (1−2c)d1−c+d >
1
8 , equivalently d(7 − 16c) > 1 − c. If this could be
true at all for some c, it would be true for the largest possible, d, which is d = c. But this yields
the contradiction (4c − 1)2 < 0. 
4. A duality theorem for different adversaries and competitive ratios
Preemption is not advantageous for the player in REKP: The denominator in the competitive ratio
is independent of the target, whereas the numerator is a monotone function of completion times
of all the jobs, hence Lemma 2.1 applies. Preemption is useless also for CRKL, since for every
target the denominator is fixed and the numerator is monotone in the completion times. Hence,
for both CRKL and REKP it is again enough to look at mixed strategies that are probability
distributions on permutations. Now we are ready to show:
Theorem 4.1. Computing optimal strategies for CRKL and REKP are equivalent problems.
Proof: Let an instance of CRKL with w.l.o.g.
∑
i ci = 1 correspond to a “dual” instance of
REKP with pi = ci . (In the following we slightly abuse notation and do not distinguish between
a problem and an instance). Moreover, let any mixed strategy for CRKL correspond to a mixed
strategy for the dual REKP where we just reverse each permutation and let the probabilities of
permutations remain unchanged.
Given any mixed strategy for CRKL, the adversary will pick the target j with maximum
expected competitive ratio E[t j ]/c j where t j is the completion time of job j. In the dual REKP
she can assign arbitrary lengths di (but with
∑
i di = 1) to the jobs, before the target is selected at
random. Thus the expected target length in REKP is
∑
i di ci (since pi = ci ). As for the player’s
expected cost in REKP, note that a job j is done if this or a later job in the random permutation is
the target. Hence, the probability that job j must be done is, in any fixed permutation, the sum of
ci of all jobs i that do not preceed j. Due to the reverse permutations, the joint probability that the
mixed strategy executes j equals the completion time (!) from CRKL which is E[t j ]. It follows
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that the expected time spent on every job j is d j E[t j ], and by linearity of expectation the player’s
expected cost is
∑
i di E[ti ]. Ratio
∑
i di E[ti ]/
∑
i di ci is maximized under constraint
∑
i di = 1
if d j = 1 for some j with maximum E[t j ]/c j . What we have shown is that the adversary achieves
the same value in CRKL and REKP when the player runs a dual pair of mixed strategies. Thus,
the optimal strategies for both the problems form a dual pair. 
By this equivalence it suffices to study one of the two problems. In the following, we discuss
the more intuitive CRKL.
5. The expected competitive ratio for known lengths
By a similar approach as in Section 3 we can determine the value of any instance of CRKL.










Proof: Suppose that the player knows the target probability pi for every job i. Provided that we






















ci c j ,
where r j =
∑ j
i=1 ci/c j denotes the actual competitive ratio if j is the target. The player’s
optimal strategy is to do the jobs by decreasing p j/c2j , due to an exchange argument: If
p j/c2j < p j+1/c
2
j+1 and we exchange jobs j and j + 1, the net change of expected compet-
itive ratio is c j c j+1(p j/c2j − p j+1/c2j+1) < 0.
The adversary may choose the p j so as to maximize the value of the optimal strategy. First
of all, she may increase the sum without destroying the decreasing order of p j/c2j . As long as
p j/c2j > p j+1/c
2
j+1 for some j with r j < r j+1, she can do so by raising p j+1 at the cost of p j .
In the following, a block is a maximal consecutive sequence of jobs j with increasing r j . By the
preceding discussion, the adversary can reach equal p j/c2j within each block. Now, permutations
of jobs in the block do not alter the expected competitive ratio. Hence, we can w.l.o.g. assume
that the player executes the jobs within each block by increasing lengths c j . Next, consider some
j being the last job in its block. From r j > r j+1 it follows immediately c j < c j+1. Altogether,
the c j can only increase. We have shown that the adversary can suppose c1 ≤ · · · ≤ cn . An
optimal adversary strategy against this schedule is optimal at all. Note that the sequence of p j/c2j
has to be decreasing (otherwise the player would not choose this schedule). Thus we can write
any solution (p1, . . . , pn) as a convex linear combination of solutions where the first k ratios
pi/c2i (1 ≤ i ≤ k) are equal, followed by zeros. Consider any of the basic solutions, say with k
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for some ak = p j/c2j which has to be chosen so that
∑k





hence the expected competitive ratio is
∑




j . By linearity of expectation, the
expected competitive ratio of an arbitrary strategy with decreasing p j/c2j is a convex linear
combination of these values for the different k. Thus, the adversary’s optimal choice is the kth
basic solution where the above ratio is maximized. 
As earlier, the difficulty is to establish a mixed strategy for the player that achieves this
value. We give a partial result describing the structure of certain optimal mixed strategies. The
optimal deterministic strategy for CRKL is trivial: It schedules the jobs one-by-one, by increasing
lengths c1 ≤ · · · ≤ cn . Hence, the best deterministic competitive ratio is maxk
∑
i≤k ci/ck . By
randomization we may balance different ratios and get a better expected value. For any mixed
strategy, rk denotes from now on the expected competitive ratio if job k is the target.
Let Opt be the set of optimal mixed strategies. We distinguish a subset Opt1 ⊆ Opt of solutions
where the number of jobs k with the maximal rk is minimized. Next, let Opt2 ⊆ Opt1 be the set
of solutions in Opt1 where also the second largest value of rk is minimized and the number of
jobs attaining this second largest is minimized too. In this way we define the Opti inductively,
until we meet some i with Opti = Opti+1. We denote this last set Opt∗ and call the solutions in
Opt∗ lexicographically optimal.
Theorem 5.2. There exists a lexicographically optimal mixed strategy for any CRKL instance
with the following properties: The sequence of jobs, sorted by increasing lengths, is partitioned
into blocks, all rk within each block are equal, the rk strictly decrease from block to block, and
the order of blocks is the same in all appearing permutations.
Proof: We prove by induction on μ the existence of a solution in Opt∗ that has this block
structure for the first jobs in all appearing permutations, divided in μ blocks. The hypothesis
is vacuously true for μ = 0. Suppose that it holds for some μ. We consider any job j with the
(μ + 1) st largest rk value. (All longer jobs are in the first μ blocks).
Assume that some job i with ri < r j is done immediately before job j in some appearing
permutation π . Let π ′ be permutation π with jobs i and j switched. (π ′ may or may not already
appear in the strategy). Transferring some probability from π to π ′ improves r j at the cost of
raising ri . This contradicts lexicographic optimality. We conclude that all jobs with the (μ + 1)st
largest rk value follow immediately the μth block in all appearing permutations. This establishes
the induction step.
It remains to show that this block partition also partitions the sequence of jobs sorted by
increasing length. Assume, on the contrary, that two jobs i, j exist so that i is in an earlier block
than j, and ci > c j . But then ri < r j , a contradiction. 
We conjecture that some converse is also true: If a strategy has the above block structure and
the first block has the highest rk , then it is optimal. It would be sufficient to show that there is
no better balanced strategy (with all rk equal) for the first block. From this the assertion would
follow, since extending the first block can only raise its competitive ratio.
Once the blocks are decided, one can minimize the maximum rk independently in every block
by linear programming, details are straightforward. (Moreover, it suffices to optimize the first
block and make sure that all rk in later blocks are not larger). This suggests an iterative algorithm:
As long as the first block is not the worst, merge a block with currently highest rk into the previous
block, and rebalance the new block. Large blocks of size k, say, may give rise to k! permutations,
and thus produce k! variables (probabilities) with positive value. On the other hand, one can
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limit the set of permutations by rather obvious heuristics (basically this is a column generation
approach). In particular, if the ci in a block do not differ so much, WOF will almost minimize
the expected competitive ratio in this block. It seems that such a process quickly leads to max rk
close to optimum.
6. Discussion
It would be interesting to obtain an explicit tradeoff for approximation guarantee vs. computation
time for CRKL, based on the above preliminary thoughts, and to figure out the complexity status of
the exact problem. Dimension arguments suggest that some optimal strategy is the product of in-
dependent random distributions of jobs in each block, with a few permutations per block (not more
than the block size). However, it remains open whether it can be computed in polynomial time.
In this paper, we considered malicious adversaries. Things will become more complicated
for the more general diffuse adversaries (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 2000). At least two
different definitions of competitive ratio come in mind (Damaschke, 2004).
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